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ABSTRACT
This paper investigates whether the recent wave of corporate
restructuring in the United States has had a negative impact on research
arid development investment by industrial firms. Using a newly
constructed sample of about 2500 manufacturing firms from 1974 to 1987,
I examine three major classes of restructuring events: leveraged buyouts
and other "going private" transactions, mergers and acquisitions in
general, and substantial increases in leverage.
The major conclusions are first, that leveraged buyouts do not
occur in R&D-intensive sectors or firms and cannot therefore be having
much of an impact on R&D spending; rather, the evidence seems consistent
with an agency cost and cash flow-driven model of buyouts. Second,
major increases in leverage are followed by substantial declines in the
R&D intensity of the firms in question, and the effect takes at least
three years to work through. Finally, although the evidence on
acquisitions by publicly traded firms is mixed, the basic conclusion is
that any declines in the R&D intensity of acquiring firms relative to
their past history appear to be associated with the leverage structure
of the transaction rather than the acquisition itself.
Bronwyn H. Hall
Department of Economics
University of California at Berkeley
611 Evans Hall
Berkeley, CA 94720I. Introduction
It is a widely held view that the wave of mergers, leveraged buyouts,
and restructurings in the corporate sector during the 1980s has had and
will have a detrimental effect on industrial spending on research and the
development of new products and processes in the United States. Critics of
this recent activity point to the stagnation in real R&D expenditures by
the private sector during the eighties and suggest that these
restructurings are a major cause of the decline.1 Others view this process
as a healthy revitalization of U.S. industry in the face of foreign
competition and a changing regulatory and financialenvironment.2
Why are so many people concerned about this increase in restructuring
1See, for example, the National Science Foundation report, "Corporate
Mergers Implicated in Slowed Industrial R&D Spending," March 1989, which
identified 24 companies among the top 200 R&D performers which had
undergone mergers or other restructurings in 1984-1986. The report
found that the R&D expenditures of these firms declined by 5.3 percent
from 1986 to 1987, while those for the rest of the sample rose by 5.4
percent during the same period.
2See, for example, Michael C. Jensen, "Agency Cost of Free Cash Flow,
Corporate Finance, and Takeovers," American Economic Review 76 (1986), pp.
323-339, and "Eclipse of the Public Corporation," Harvard business Review
(Sept.-Oct. 1989), pp. 61-74 for arguments of this sort.
1activity? After all, the traditional view of economists (at least since
the work of Miller and Modigliani)3 has been that the investment policy of
the firm should be independent of its choice of financial structure; one
implication of this theoretical result is that the R&D policy of a firm
should be unaffected by its choice of leverage. Yet it is clear that many
economists and businessmen believe that the increases in debt-equity ratios
which are typical of the corporate restructurings and acquisitions of the
present day put pressure on the firm to use its cash flow to service the
long term debt at the expense of investments, particularly those of a
long term nature such as R&D. The argument is that substituting debt for
equity substitutes a fixed interest obligation for the optional dividends
which were formerly paid to shareholders, thus leaving the discretionary
spending of earnings vulnerable to downturns in the industry or economy.
This argument, while superficially persuasive, has several obvious
problems; first, if good (high payback) investment projects are available,
the firm should be able to finance them by going again to the equity or
debt markets when retained earnings are not available. The source of
financing for these projects should have nothing whatever to do with
whether they are undertaken. Second, if the merger, acquisition, or LBO
truly causes good projects to be canceled, the firm should be worth less
under the new ownership form, and the shareholders should not have accepted
an offer which reflects this lower value, or conversely, the buyers should
not have been willing to offer more than the current trading price.
3Franco Modigliani and Merton H. Miller, "The Cost of Capital, Corporation
Finance and the Theory of Investment," American Economic Review 48, pp.
261-297, and Merton H. Miller and Franco Modigliani, "Dividend Policy,
Growth, and the Valuation of Shares," Journal Business 34, pp. 411-433..
2Most of those who stress the beneficial effect of takeover and
restructuring activity would agree with the second of the above arguments,
but not the first; that is, they do not rely on Miller-Modigliani in its
pure form, but argue that the market values the firm's prospects correctly,
but that managers have a tendency to make the wrong (from the point of view
of the shareholder) investment choices and thus a firm can be "undervalued'
by a market which perceives this fact but is not 100 percent certain that a
raider will come along to correct the situation. In other words, they
would argue that in many cases, diverting the cash flow being spent on
investment projects to interest payments on debt is a good discipline for
the firm's managers, since they have a tendency to invest in projects whose
return is lower than alternatives which would be available to the firm's
shareholders if they instead received the earnings as dividends.4 An
implication of this "efficient markets" view of corporate restructuring is
that substantial increases in debt should occur in firms and industries
where the available investment projects are low return (such as shrinking,
older industries and those without a strong technological base).
Thus there are two different arguments which imply that increases in
corporate restructuring, particularly those associated with increases in
leverage, will be associated with declines in R&D spending (and investment
in general), but these two arguments lead to opposing conclusions as to the
social cost or benefit of such changes. The first (optimistic?) view is
that financial markets are "efficient", but the managers of firms do not
always act in the shareholders' interest (agency costs). Because long-term
4Michael C. Jensen (1986).
3debt provides managerial discipline, and the market knows this, we tend to
see leveraging occur in industries and situations where good payback
projects are not available (i.e., where R&D is low or ought to be). Thus
we expect R&D to fall after a (leveraged) acquisition in this story, but
this fact has no negative connotation.
The second argument assumes that financial markets are myopic, and do
not value long term investments like R&D properly, so that firms which
undertake them may be undervalued and provide attractive takeover
opportunities. After the takeover event (or the successful defense of a
hostile takeover), potentially "good" R&D projects are cut in order to
sustain the interest payments on the increased long term debt. The
implication of this argument is that market myopia is to blame and that the
public good may be served by interfering with the takeover process.
The main distinction between these two lines of reasoning is in the
results: both suggest that increases in debt will be followed by cuts in
R&D projects, but in the first case this is at the least privately optimal,
whereas in the second, R&D projects which have high potential rates of
return may be cut. Owing to the fact that we do not observe these projects
and their outcomes, it is difficult to see how to choose between these two
pictures of the world except by indirect evidence: we can investigate the
general question of whether there does appear to be market myopia with
respect to R&D investment, or we can explore the characteristics of the
actual transactions -- inwhich industries do they occur, what kinds of
projects appear to be cut, is there evidence that R&D is actually being
threatened.
There already exist several pieces of evidence to suggest that
financial markets are not completely myopic with respect to R&D spending:
4these studies are of two different types, a pair of event studies in the
finance literature,5 and a series of total market value studies including
6
R&D capital. The event studies investigate the immediate stock price
effect of an announcement of an increase in R&D spending; the argument is
that if the market is myopic, the announcement of such a long-term
investment project should have a negative price effect because the market
expects that short-term earnings will be adversely affected. Jarrell et
al. studied 62 firms that announced an increase in R&D spending and found
that the average 20-day appreciation in the stock of such firms was 1.8
percent. The Woolridge study controlled more carefully for R&D investment
announcements which were accompanied by other earnings news, and still
found a 30-day excess return of 1.5 percent associated with R&D increases
for 45 such announcements. This evidence argues against extreme market
myopia, but a drawback of this type of approach is that it says nothing
about whether the size if the market reaction is of the right order of
magnitude: does the increase in value of the firm have any connection to
the expected present discounted value of the (surprise in) the returns to
be generated from this investment increase? If not, the market may still
be discriminating against such investments.
5Gregg A. Jarrell, Ken Lehn, and Wayne Marr, "Institutional Ownership,
Tender Offers, and Long-Term Investments", (Securities and Exchange
Commission, April 1985), and J. Randall Woolridge, "Competitive Decline and
Corporate Restructuring: Is a Myopic Stock Market to Blame?" Journal
Applied Corporate Finance 1 (Spring 1988), pp.26-36.
6Zvj Griliches, "Market Value, R&D, and Patents," Economic Letters 7
(1981), pp. 183-187; lain Cockburn and Zvi Criliches, "Industry Effects and
Appropriability Measures in the Stock Market's Valuation of R&D and
Patents" (NBER Working Paper No. 2465, December 1987); Bronwyn H. Hall,
"The Value of Intangible Corporate Assets: An Empirical Study of the
Components of Tobin's Q" (NBER and University of California at Berkeley,
November 1988).
5A similar argument, but one applied to managerial myopia rather than
market myopia is presented by Stein:7 "The more reluctant managers are to
invest, the higher will be the present value of those few projects that
they do find sufficiently attractive to undertake and, hence, the more
positive should be the market reaction to the announcement of a new
investment." The same type of reasoning suggests that value-maximizing
managers facing a myopic stock market may choose to undertake only
very high-return R&D projects, but these would still produce positive
announcement effects.
The other type of evidence is a long-term analysis in levels: the
basic idea is to regress the total market value of the firm (debt plus
equity) on the book value of the assets, both tangible and intangible,
arguing that long run equilibrium implies that all the assets should be
priced at their book value on average, at least in the cross section.
Departures from a coefficient of unity are interpreted as an overpricing or
underpricing of the particular asset by the market. The regressions are
usually performed with the intangible assets (the stock of R&D capital or
patents, advertising, etc.) measured relative to the physical assets, so
that the coefficient measures the relative price of such capital (a
coefficient of unity is not imposed on the tangible assets). The results
here strongly indicate that R&D capital is not seriously underpriced
(Cockburn and Criliches obtain a coefficient of around 1.4, while I get
about 0.9 using a larger sample of firms for more years; both studies find
a coefficient for tangible assets which is insignificantly different from
7Jeremy C. Stein, "Takeover Threats and Managerial Myopia," Journal
Political Economy 96 (February 1988): pp. 61-80.
6unity). However, belief that this coefficient represents the market's
pricing of R&D investment rests crucially on the choice of depreciation
rate used to construct the R&D capital.8 If the depreciation rate were
actually higher than the 15 percent used in both studies (a likely
possibility, since for these purposes, the depreciation rate we want
measures the decline in the atproDriable R&D capital), the true value of
the coefficient would be even higher. An interesting finding in both these
studies is that the valuation of the current R&D flow is even higher than
that predicted by the coefficient of the stock, which does suggest that
rapid depreciation is taking place.
Taken together, these pieces of evidence seem to rule out total market
myopia towards long-term investment as a reasonable hypothesis; no one who
reads the glossy annual reports of high technology companies, which trumpet
their R&D spending, would seriously entertain the idea that the market does
not value it at all. However, there are limitations to this approach: the
event studies do not really tell whether we got the correct order of
magnitude, only that the sign was right. The market value studies are
flawed in that there is typically a one-to-one relationship between the
"depreciation" of R&D and the coefficient of the stock, so that we cannot
tell precisely whether financial markets value the R&D stock correctly, but
only that they value it.
Thus, in this paper I take a different approach to investigating
8This is not a new point: see, for example, Zvi Griliches (1981). See
also Ariel Pakes and Mark Schankerman, "The Rate of Obsolescence of
Patents, Research Gestation Lags, and the Private Rate of Return to
Research Resources," in Zvi Griliches, ed., Patents. Productivity
(University of Chicago Press, 1984) for a discussion of the evidence on
depreciation or decay rates for the appropriable revenues from R&D
expenditures.
7whether financial markets discriminate against long-term investments (and
thus ignore the returns to such investment while encouraging financial
restructurings). I focus on the R&D characteristics and outcomes of the
actual restructurings which occur, and attempt informally to see which of
the two descriptions of the world seem consistent with the facts.
The goal of the paper is to assess the empirical evidence on the
implications of corporate restructuring on industrial research spending,
focusing specifically on the manufacturing sector of the economy, where
most industrial R&D is performed. To this end, I have constructed a new
panel dataset for U.S. manufacturing firms from the Compustat files,9
containing publicly available data on the R&D spending and other
characteristics of about 2500 firms from 1959 through 1987 (annual data)
I use this file to investigate the actual consequences for R&D spending of
the different types of changes in corporate structure which have taken
place in the last ten years: mergers and acquisitions, both public and
private, leveraged buyouts, and increases in debt levels which are not
accompanied by ownership changes. After collecting the evidence, I turn to
an examination of what the results can and cannot tell us about the
questions posed at the beginning of the introduction.
I. ThTrendsjfl Q Corporate Restructurtn
To set the stage for what follows, I begin by examining the recent
aggregate trends in industrial research and corporate restructurings in
9Standard and Poor Corporation, Compustat Annual Industrjal.
Over-the-Counter ResearchFiles (New York: Standard and Poor
Corporation, 1978-1987 editions).
10Bronwyn H. Hall, "The Manufacturing Sector Master File: 1959-1987" (NBER
and the University of California at Berkeley, 1989).
8order to define more carefully the facts which I would like to explain. In
spite of attempts by researchers here and abroad to find better measures of
innovative activity, expenditures on Research and Development remain the
most widely available and best measured of the so-called "scientific
indicators."11 Since they are also almost the only data on innovation
available at the firm level at this time,12 I rely on them exclusively in
what follows.
Figure 1 shows three different measures of the level of real
industrial R&D expenditures between 1972 and 1987. The solid curve is the
total amount of R&D expenditure which industrial firms funded themselves
(that is, was not paid for by the government or other source), as reported
to NSF.13'14 The concern raised by the data behind this figure is that while
R&D grew at an average rate of close to 7 percent per annum in real
11See the various national and international publications on scientific
indicators, e.g., National Science Foundation, Science Indicators
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1987); OECD, iin
Scienceand Technology Indicators (Paris: OECD, various years); Statistics
Canada, Canadian Science Indicators (Ottawa: Ministry of Supplies and
Services, various years).
121n the past, I and coauthors at the National Bureau of Economic Research
have also used patent statistics for this purpose [see Zvi Criliches, Ariel
Pakes, and Bronwyn H. Hall, "The Value of Patents as Indicators of
Inventive Activity," in Partha Dasgupta and Paul Stoneman, eds., Economic
Policy and Technological Performance (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1987) for a summary of this work. Owing both to the fact that we
have found patents and R&D to be highly correlated in the cross section in
the past, with patents a far noisier measure than R&D, and because budget
and time constraints preclude the data construction effort needed to add
individual firm patent counts to my new panel dataset, I have chosen not
use patents here.I may attempt to incorporate them in future work on this
topic.
13National Science Foundation, Science Indicators (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1987).
14A11 series on this figure have been deflated by and updated version of the
"Griliches-Jaffe" R&D deflator, which is a weighted average of a labor cost
index and the implicit price deflator in the non-financial corporate sector
(Bronwyn H. Hall, Clint Cunmiins, Elizabeth Laderman, and Joy Mundy, "The
R&D Master File Documentation," NBF.R Technical Working Paper No. 72, 1988).
9terms between 1979 and 1984, the rate of growth has dropped to two percent
per annum in the last three or four years; examination of aggregate
investment patterns during the same period shows a smaller decline, from a
growth rate of four percent per annum to approximatelyzero)5 Is this
decline related to the increase in corporate restructuring, as some would
suggest? Certainly the timing is right: Table I shows that the total size
(in terms of numbers of employees) of corporate restructurings was roughly
constant between 1978 and 1984, and then doubled suddenly in 1985,
increasing again in 1986 to three times its earlier level. Before I
discuss this table in detail, however, I will digress slightly to describe
briefly how it and my dataset were constructed.
Most of the empirical results in this paper are based on the first
results from a large dataset construction effort to build a new panel of
Compustat firms in manufacturing which contains data from 1959 through 1987
for firms on Compustat during at least one year between 1976 and 1987.16
This sample consists of about 2500 manufacturing firms which were in
existence sometime between 1976 and 1987, augmented by a few
non-manufacturing firms which were formerly manufacturing firms or which
acquired manufacturing firms during the period. In the course of the
construction of this panel dataset, I identified about 1200 firms which had
exited by the last year (1987). For all these firms, the reason for exit
(type of acquisition, bankruptcy, liquidation, name change, or other
reason), the actual year of the event, the stock market value at the time
15Economic Report President(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1989), Table B-63, Manufacturing Investment in Plant and
Equipment.
:L6BronwynH.Hall, "The Manufacturing Sector Master File: 1959-1987."
10of exit (acquisition or liquidation price), and the name of the acquirer
were looked up in variety of printedsources.17 After cleaning and checking
all the exits, I obtained the final result that about 480 of these had been
acquired during the period by other publicly traded firms, about 100 by
foreign firms, and about 250 went private through LEOorother transaction.
Approximately 130 went bankrupt or were liquidated. The remainder were not
true exits, but were name changes or delistings from the stock exchanges.18
This list of exits is a key input into the study of corporate
restructurings, since all such events which involve an entire firm will
appear on this list except for the case where a firm restructures by buying
back its stock and issuing a large amount of debt, i.e., by increasing its
leverage ratio substantially. Using this dataset, however, I attempted to
identify these cases as well, by computing the change in long term debt
for each firm from year-to-year and dividing it by the market
capitalization of the firm at the beginning of the year (that is, by the
sum of debt and equity). Firms with changes in debt which were larger than
75 percent of this number in any one year were deemed to have restructured
during that year.
The table shows that acquisitions of all types (where size is
17Key sources are the .11.StreetJournal Index (Princeton, N.J.: Dow Jones
Books), Capital Cbaiwes Reporter (Chicago: Commerce Clearing House), and
the Directory Obsolete Securities (no publisher given).
LSThe delistings are a small fraction of the total (about 30 firms, mostly
very small) which generally were delisted because of financial distress
(valueless stock) or because shareholder interest fell below the cutoffs
imposed by the exchanges; to a great extent, firms of this type exit for
another reason such as liquidation or acquisition, but the few which I
cannot identify as having done so end up in this class. The name changes
and other reorganizations are larger in number (about 200 firms during the
period), and for these firms I attempt to splice the data for the
reorganized or renamed firm, when I can find it on the file, to that from
the old firm. Most of the time I was successful in this effort.
11measured by the number of employees) have been increasing in the
manufacturing sector during the 1980s, with the increase in acquisitions by
privately held or foreign firms occurring somewhat later than the rise in
leveraging or acquisitions as a whole. In 1977, only-one half of 1
percent of employment in this sector was affected by these transactions,
whereas in 1986 (the last year for which complete data are available) 6.4
percent of employment was.
Does my panel dataset show the same type of aggregate R&D behavior as
the NSF numbers? To answer this question, I look again at Figure 1: The
top curve is the total R&D expenditure by firms in mysample.19 The
closeness of this series to the NSF data up until about 1984 is a bit
misleading, since neither one is a subset of the other: the primary
differences are that the NSF numbers include R&D done by non-publicly
traded firms, and the Compustat numbers (my sample) contain
foreign-performed R&D as well as domestic. I show both series so that one
can get some idea of how my sample reflects the economy as a whole. The
increasing divergence in the two series is undoubtedly due to the
increasing presence of foreign firms on U.S. stock market exchanges and the
increasing performance of U.S. R&D abroad (which is included in the
Compustat numbers, but not in NSFs).
19lnitial analysis of the data for firms in my sample revealed a shortfall
of the number of firms with good data in 1987. This turned out to be due
to the fact that Compustat had not yet updated the data series for
approximately 140 of the 1650 firms in my sample in 1987; those which were
missing data were predominantly smaller firms from the OTC file. In order
not to bias the interpretation of the trends too much, I have adjusted the
1987 figures to reflect the fraction of the firms which were missing 1987
data, using the employment figures for these firms from the previous year.
This yields about a seven percent increase in any totals for 1987,
including those in Figures 1 and 2.
12To verify this and examine the discrepancies further, in the same
figure I show the R&D expenditure for Compustat firms with the expenditures
by foreign-owned firms which are included in the database removed (the
bottom curve).20 This series tracks the NSF series very closely until the
last two or three years. where it does not show the same type of decline
(but remember that the 1987 numbers are partially estimated due to the
incompleteness of the sample for this year). The remaining discrepancy is
undoubtedly due to the few privately held firms in the United States which
report R&D to NSF, but are not required to file 10-Ks with the Securities
and Exchange Commission.
Figure 2 shows the same result in a different way: the growth rates
of real R&D expenditure from NSF and for the domestic portion of the
Compustat sample are very close until 1986, when my data shows less of a
decline than NSF; the major remaining discrepancy in the data is due to R&D
performed abroad by U.S. firms, which may indeed have been increasing,
accounting for the difference between the two sets of numbers. The
conclusion to be drawn from these two figures is that my data will be
adequate for drawing conclusions about the effects of corporate
restructuring on aggregate R&D, although changes in the very recent past
may be somewhat imprecisely measured, since the Compustat data shows much
less of a decline than the NSF data.
II. Private Acquisitions and Leveraged Buyouts
I begin by examining a type of restructuring that has been
1972, this spending comprised only 3 percent of the total, but by
1987 it had risen to 18 percent, so that including it in the total will
seriously bias conclusions about aggregate R&D spending by U.S. firms.
13specifically attacked as a major cause of declines in R&D spending, but
which turns out to be a very minor part of the story in manufacturing: the
"going private" transaction, and in particular, the leveraged buyout.
Leveraged buyout is the general term used for a transaction which changes
both the ownership and financial structure of a public corporation. In a
typical buyout, the firm changes from a public company to one that is
privately held by a small group of investors including management, and the
equity of the firm is replaced to a large extent by corporate debt held by
banks, insurance companies, and other purchasers of high-yield debt. The
benefits of this kind of restructuring are held to be twofold: first, for
some firms, debt may be a relatively cheaper form of financing than equity,
and second, concentrating the ownership of the firm in the hands of a few
managers and friendly banks may reduce or eliminate the agency costs which
arise when the ownership of the firm is widely dispersed across public
shareholders.
Kohlberg, Kravis, and Roberts, an investment firm which assists in a
great many of these transactions, summarize their criteria for selecting
companies as follows:21 1) a history of profitability and steady cash flow,
2) products with well-known brand names and strong market position, 3)
low-cost producers, 4) potential for real growth without cyclical swings in
profitability, 5) products which are not subject to rapid technological
change. Looking over these criteria, the goal seems clear: minimize
volatility in earnings and ensure a stable source of rents so that the debt
involved can be serviced. These criteria, particularly the last, will not
21Kohlberg, Kravis, Roberts, and Co., "Presentation on Leveraged Buyouts"
(KKR, January 1989).
14generally select in favor of firms where R&D is important, which increases
the probability that the LBO offer will dominate an offer financed in a
different manner (under the assumption the markets are efficient, at least
at acquisition time).
It is perhaps natural that practitioners of the LEO should focus on
the problem of servicing the debt incurred by the transaction and that
therefore they should appear to be focused exclusively on the cash flow
properties of the asset in question. However,Williamson22 has provided an
alternative, although complementary, view of the motivation of the
leveraged buyout. His argument is that the LEO will take place in a firm
where the leverage ratio has gotten out of alignment, due to the maturity
of the line of business and the size of the tangible assets. Although
these characteristics are correlated with smooth cash flow, there are
important differences: for example, a major asset of many firms
experiencing LBOs is not redeployable, but can be relied upon to generate a
steady source of rents. This asset may be loosely labelled "brand name
recognition." It is created by a combination of investments, tangible and
intangible (advertising), and is likely to be greater in more mature firms.
The assets created by investments in R&D are precisely those which are
not very redeployable (and are often difficult to transfer without
substantial investments by the receiving firm): the knowledge of how to
operate a new process or make a new product. A foreclosing bank is likely
to discount an R&D laboratory and the human capital vested in its employees
far more highly than it will discount the value of an office building or
22Oliver E. Williamson. "Corporate Finance and Corporate Governance,"
Journal of Finance 43 (1988), pp. 467-491.
15factory full of general purpose equipment. Thus both cash flow and asset
specificity considerations argue strongly that LBOs will not take place in
firms and industries where R&D is important. In the following I
investigate whether that is indeed the case.
In my sample of approximately 700 acquisitions of publicly traded
manufacturing firms between 1977 and 1988, I was able to identify about 80
acquisitions as leveraged buyouts using several sources: a list kindly
supplied to me by Steven Kaplan, the cJall Street Journal articles reporting
the event, and the Kerer jjAcciuisitionSourcebook, which reports the
type of financing used to make an acquisition. The remainder of the
acquisitions where the acquirer was not another publicly traded firm (about
180 of them) were generally smaller and could not be clearly identified as
management or leveraged buyouts, although it is possible that some of them
are.
Table 2 shows the total number of acquisitions which occurred in each
year between 1977 and 1987 and the number of those which were leveraged
buyouts and other "going private' transactions.23 To give an idea of the
increasing size and importance of the LBO, the next five columns show the
total employment involved, the average number of employees in each type
of deal, and the percent of manufacturing sector employment which was
affected. It is clear from the table that the number and size of each LBO
have increased during the mid—eighties, while the private acquisitions
have remained roughly constant in size (while increasing in number).
23have excluded from this table transactions in my sample which took
place in 1988 and 1989, since this part of the sample is incomplete and
would give a misleading picture of the aggregate.
16However, note that only in 1987 has the number of employees affected risen
above 1 percent of the total. Although a great deal of ink has been
spilled about these types of transactions, they are still small relative to
the sector as a whole.
Table 3 examines the industrial composition of the LBOs, paying
particular attention to the amount of research and development investment
involved (the data for the private acquisitions are very similar and are
omitted to save space). The first column characterizes the R&D performance
of the industry by displaying the average R&D intensity of all the firms
within that industry in 1976 (the year the sample was drawn). The next two
columns show the number of LBOs which occurred in that industry and the
total number of employees involved. It is easy to see from these adjacent
columns that industries with high R&D intensity are industries where little
L0 activity takes place: There are only seven LBOs (with 70,000 employees)
24
in the six industries where R&D is greater than 2 percent of sales on
average, while there are 58 (with over 600,000 employees) in the ten
industries where R&D is less than 1 percent of sales.25
The final three columns assess the potential impact of these leveraged
buyouts on the different industries. The column labelled "Total industrial
R&D" gives the spending by all the Compustat firms in the industry in 1982,
while the column labelled "R&D in LBOs" gives the R&D spending for each
firm involved in an LB0 for the year closest to the transaction for which
24Two of these LEOs account for most of the employment acquired in these
industries: Revlon, which is not really in a high-tech industry, and
Lear-Siegler, an aerospace-automotive-electronics conglomerate.
25For the private transactions, the results are even stronger: there are 24
transactions in the six high-R&D industries involving 25,000 employees, but
144 in the ten low-R&D industries involving 467,000 employees.
17the data were available (usually one or two years before) .Thesefigures
have been deflated so that they are all in 1982 dollars forcomparability.26
The percentage figures are intended to give an idea of the importance of
the transactions for R&D in any given industry; since the numerator is
measured over several years and the denominator is a flow variable (the R&D
spending in 1982), these figures are a very rough measure of the importance
of the transactions to the R&D of the industry.
These columns show that only in the Textile, Rubber and Plastics, and
Stone, Clay, and Glass industries is a significant share of R&D investment
even involved in these transactions. In terms of absolute magnitudes, five
industries account for over 75 percent of the R&D acquired through LBOs:
Textiles, Pharmaceuticals ($100 million of which is the previously
mentioned Revlon transaction), Rubber and Plastics, Electronics (the
Lear-Siegler buyout), and the Automotive industry. Aside from the Revlon
and Lear-Siegler deals, the main story seems to be one in which the
leveraged buyout facilitates the shrinkage of an older, low-techindustry.27
Such industries already have had low R&D spending for a long time, so that
increases in LBO activity have very little effect. Another way to see this
is to note that the 762,000 employees involved are about 4 percent of the
total employment in 1982, while the $471 million of R&D is only 1 percent
of the total in 1982. Both the industries involved and the relative
unimportance of R&D confirm that LBO activity is largely confined to
26See Bronwyn H.Hall, Clint Cuinmins, Elizabeth Laderman, and Joy Mundy
(1988) for a description of the construction of this deflator.
fact has already been noted by Steven Kaplan ("Management Buyouts:
Evidence on Post-Buyout Operating Changes", University of Chicago Graduate
School of Business, 1989) and Frank R. Lichtenberg and Donald Siegel ("The
Effects of Leveraged Buyouts on Productivity and Related Aspects of Firm
Behavior," Columbia Graduate School of Business and the NBER, 1989).
18sectors which are not technologically oriented.
Although I would like to study the subsequent history of those firms
which went private via leveraged buyouts, this is difficult because in many
cases they no longer must file 10-Ks with the SEC (this is in fact one of
the stated reasons for going private). In spite of this fact, Kaplan28 has
found that for at least some of these LBOs it is possible to find
publicly-reported post-buyout data. For his sample of about 40 LBOs, he
finds that only seven are even performing R&D, before or after the buyout.29
Using an entirely different sampling methodology (the establishment-based
Census of Manufacturing coupled with data from the previously mentioned NSF
30
RD-i Survey), Lichtenberg and Siegelhave analyzed the 43 firms which
underwent LBOs between 1981 and 1986 and also were surveyed byNSF.31 They
found that the R&D intensity of those firms which were performing &fl
increasedby roughly the same amount as non-LBO firms during the same
period, although the average intensity of even the R&D-doing firms which
underwent LBOs was half that of the sample of R&D performers as a whole.
This last fact is consistent with my results.
The major conclusion from this part of the investigation is that
restructurings which take manufacturing firms private do not pose a major
threat to R&D investment in the United States. This is not because R&D is
necessarily maintained at the same levels after such transactions (which
28Steven Kaplan (1989).
29Steven Kaplan, private communication, 1989.
30Frank R. Lichtenberg and Donald Siegel (June 1989).
31Their sample of entire-firm LBOs between 1981 and 1986 consists of 80 LEOs
which account for about 70 percent of the aggregate 120 value during that
period. Although there is undoubtedly substantial overlap with my sample
of 62 during the same period, the samples will not be identical.
19often do involve increased levels of debt), but because R&D-intensive firms
and high-technology industries are not good candidates for these
acquisitions. In addition, the limited evidence we have does suggest that
even in those cases where an R&D-performing firm does undergo a leveraged
buyout, the newly private firm maintains the same pattern of investment.
These facts, together with the Lichtenberg and Siegel results on
productivity increases following LBOs,32 lend credence to the "efficient
markets" view of at least this type of restructuring activity. In the next
section I move on to look at a far more important set of acquisitions,
those by other publicly traded firms, which affect three times as many
employees as those discussed in this section of the paper.
III. Acciuisition Activity j the Manufacturing Sector
In previous work33 I investigated the relationship between the increase
in acquisition activity in the U.S. corporate sector in the early eighties
and R&D investment using a large panel of U.S. manufacturing firms. I
found that the manufacturing sector acquisitions from 1976 to 1986 fell
into two main groups: half were acquired by firms in my sample (the
publicly traded manufacturing sector), and half by private or foreign
firms. The latter group were disproportionately in low-tech industries
(most of which are low-growth also), and accounted for only fourteen
percent of the total R&D that was acquired and less than one percent of the
32Lichtenberg and Siegel (June 1989). They find significant increases in
productivity growth at the plant level in the five years following an LEO,
and substantial reductions in Central Office overhead expense, which argues
for the efficiency-enhancing aspects of these transactions.
33Bronwyn H. Hall, "The Effect of Takeover Activity on Corporate Research
and Development," in Alan J. Auerbach, ed., Corporate Takeovers: Causes and
Consequences (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1988), pp. 69-96.
20total R&D in the manufacturing sector. We have already seen that this
characterization of at least the private acquisitions holds when I
extend the period examined through 1987.
I then went on to investigate what happened afterwards in the sample
of acquisitions which remained in the publicly traded sector. Using a
sample of about 300 acquisitions, I calculated the change in R&Dintensity
for the combined firm pre- and post-merger (over two and three year
intervals). There was no significant evidence of declines in spending,
although the relatively short intervals after merger and small samples at
the industry level made the tests somewhat less than conclusive. The
same question was also studied byFusfeld35 using a much smaller (9
observations) sample of significant financial restructurings, and he
reached the same conclusion. In both studies, there is evidence that
longer periods after merger should be examined. In addition, the recently
completed study of 24 major mergers and restructurings by the National
Science Foundation previously cited36 provides evidence of a substantial
decline in R&D spending after acquisition or other restructuring. All of
this suggests that the question is worth further investigation.
Why are the NSF results different from mine and Fusfeld's? There are
34The acquisitions by foreign firms are a different matter; the total size
of these transactions in the two years 1986 and 1987 was the same as in the
previous ten years, and their R&D and industry profiles are more like that
of the public acquisitions now, although somewhat less R&D-intensive. They
appear to be driven by the increasing globalization of the economy rather
than by the desire to increase leverage.
35Herbert I. Fusfeld, "Corporate Restructuring: What Impact on U.S.
Industrial Research?" Research Manazement 30 (July-August 1987), pp.
10-77.
36National Science Foundation (1989).
21several possibilities: as mentioned above, they use a different data source
(the RD-i survey conducted for them by the Census Bureau, which is
confidential), the period they examine is somewhat more recent, they focus
specifically on restructurings which are not necessarily acquisitions, and
they use a different measure of R&D performance, the level of R&D
expenditures rather than R&D intensity. It is unlikely that the
differences between the two data sources for R&D spending, the 10-K report
and the RD-i survey, will be systematically biased, although they are
undoubtedly different.37 However, as Lichtenberg andSiegel38 point out, the
NSF sample consisted of one major LBO and seven other restructurings in
addition to 16 acquisitions, so the samples are not directly comparable.
The most important difference is that NSF used the level of R&D investment
rather than the intensity, which I would argue is misleading, since it
fails to adjust for the overall change in the average size of manufacturing
firms during the same period. The discrepancy is magnified both because
the majority of these restructurings seem to be directed at shrinking the
firms and because the overall size of the manufacturing sector was
shrinking at the same time.
My previous study used data on acquisitions which took place before
1987 and my panel actually ended in 1985, so I was not able to track
37These differences have been discussed earlier; at the individual firm
level, the primary differences are that the NSF numbers do not include R&D
spending by U.S. firms abroad, nor do they include contracted out research
or some routine engineering expenditures (National Science Foundation,
Comparative Analysis Information National Industrial BExpenditures
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office), Special Report
85-311). None of these differences (which affect a subset of the firms,
mostly the larger ones) are likely to be large enough to change conclusions
about R&D growth in firms undergoing acquisition.
38Frank R. Lichtenberg and Donald Siegel, June 1989.
22post-acquisition R&Dformergers which took place in 1985 and 1986 very
well. Therefore I now repeat my earlier test for post-acquisition
declines in R&D intensity using the 480 acquisitions in my new sample. The
distribution of two year changes in combined-firm R&D intensity for firms
which participated in mergers and for those who did not is shown in Figure
3. For firms which were not acquired, the average two-year change over the
whole 1976 to 1987 period is used.
The figure shows both the changes for all firms, including those which
report no R&D during the period, and then the changes only for those firms
which do have R&D data both before and after the acquisition.39 The top
part of the figure tells a slightly different story from my 1987 paper:
there does appear to be a significant difference between the distributions
for mergers and non-mergers. This is confirmed by a non-parametric
Wilcoxon test for differences in the distribution, which yields a x2(l) —
9.5.The difference between the two distributions is small, but it is
significant. However, it does not occur when we confine the sample to those
firms which reported R&D both before and after the acquisition; for the
bottom panel of the figure, the Wilcoxon test yields a 2(l) —0.5.This
implies that most of the decline is coming from R&D-doing firms which are
absorbed into firms which do not report R&D.4°
39Firtns are mandated both by the Financial Accounting Standards Board and by
the SEC to report R&D expenditures in their Annual Reports if they are
"material". Most of the firms in the technology sector do so,
particularly since they view it as a positive signal for investors. When
R&Dis not reported, it usually means that the R&D to sales ratio is very
low. However, there can be exceptions to this rule for some firms in some
years; for the small number of cases where this happens for one year out of
many with positive R&D, I have interpolated the missing number.
40There are about 80 such firms in the sample, and about 50 firms which did
not report R&D before being acquired, but whose acquirers did afterwards.
The number of acquirers which switch from reporting R&D to rion-reportirg or
23To examine this result more precisely and to investigate whether it
has changed over time, I perform a simple comparison of means, while
controlling for differences across industry and time in the average firm
R&D intensity. That is, I ask the question: How does the R&D intensity of
those firms in my sample which acquired other firms differ in the years
immediately following the transaction from that of other firms in the same
industry during the same period? I regress the R&D intensity foreach
firm-year observation on a set of industry and year dummies and ondummies
for whether this particular firm is zero, one, two, or three years away
from having acquired another firm in my sample. This regression is
performed with the hypothesized "acquisition" effect assumed constant over
all the years, and also allowing it to vary from year to year. If the
acquisition mix is changing over time, this latter method is required to
avoid biasing the estimates of the effect. It also will tell us whether
the difference in my results with data through 1985 and 1987 is due to a
shift in behavior.
The results of these regressions are shown in Figure 4 and summarized
in Table 4. The top half of this table shows results for all the firms in
all the years, treating any observations which have no R&D data as zero-R&D
observations (which most, but not all of them will be). The average effect
is negative and it increases as we go one or two years out from the
vice-versa around the time of acquisition is about 30, with a larger number
electing to stop reporting (20) than start (10). Thus more firms choose to
treat R&D spending as non-material after acquisition than switch to
reporting it, which leads to a small decline in average R&D intensity when
we include these firms. However, the probability of making a reporting
switch, conditional on the state in which the firm finds itself before
acquisition, is the same for either non-reporting or reporting, so it is
difficult to know what to conclude from this.
24acquisition, reaching almost one half of one percent in the second year
after the acquisition. However, even in this year the coefficient is not
significant at conventional levels (a t-statistic of 1.6) and the
individual year effects are widely varying and all insignificant. The
predominant effect appears to be negative, but there is huge variability in
R&D performance even within an industry, and this dominates the estimates
of the differences of the means. To put it concisely, the summary
F-statistic for an acquisition effect on R&D intensity is F(38,20137) —
0.45when I measure individual year effects or F(4,20171) —1.70when I
constrain the effect to be the same for all vintages.
If I include the firm's own lagged R&D intensity instead of using
industry dummies to predict the average expected level, the effects are
even smaller and less significant. However, the first lag of R&D intensity
occurs during the year in which the acquisition took place, which may be an
atypical year for the firm's data. Therefore, in Table 4 I also show the
results for R&D intensity lagged twice (using the year before acquisition
to control for the acquiring firm's average R&D to sales ratio). The
results are closer to those I obtain when I only control for the R&D
intensity of the firm's two digit industry; whether I control only for
industry, or for the specific firm, I obtain a similar result: the R&D
intensity appears to decline after acquisition, but by an insignificant
amount.
In spite of the statistically insignificant results, Figure 4 tells a
different story: this figure shows how the difference in mean R&D
intensity between acquiring and non-acquiring firms evolves over time
relative to the firms' two-digit industry. The four lines are the effects
0 to 3 years from the date of the acquisition. A pattern clearly emerges
25from this graph: the acquisitions in the lateryears are followed by far
greater declines in R&D intensity and the declines appear to be permanent,
in the sense that they do not become any smaller even threeyears after the
acquisition. Although still insignificant, the declines are quite large i..
economic terms, a change of intensity of more than onepercent in some
41
years.
Because of the near constancy of the effect over severalyears after
the acquisition, I chose to constrain the acquisition effectto be
permanent, that is, to permanently lower the expected R&D intensity of the
acquiring firm. These results are shown in Figure 5, where Icompare the
R&D intensity relative to that of a firm's industry andto its own lagged
intensity. The pattern here is quite striking: over time, the R&Dto
sales ratios of acquiring firms are fallingsubstantially, but when we
control for the past R&D to sales ratio of the firmitself, there is no
such decline (for one lag) or only a small effect(for two lags). This
suggests that the mix of firms performing acquisitions during theperiod
from 1977 to 1987 is shifting toward those which havelow R&D intensity
relative to their own industry.
What should we conclude from this? Even ifwe concede that the
methodology is flawed because we cannot assume a oneway causal relationship
graph reveals that the lack of conventional statisticalsignificance
may be due to the inadequacy of the probability model I am using to
construct the test. However, the major defect inmy model is that I treat
each firm-year as a random draw net of time andindustry effects, rather
than allowing for correlation acrossyears for each firm; one expects that
allowing for such correlation would actually lower the significance level
rather than raising it. One can get an idea of what theresult would be in
that case by looking at the test-statistics for theregression where I
include the firm's own lagged R&D intensity (thesecond, third, fifth, and
sixth lines of Table 2), which is almost likeincluding a fixed firm effect in the model.
26between the making of an acquisition and the R&D intensity of the firmin
succeeding years (since both are aspects of a particular corporate strategy
of a particular firm), the fact remains that evidence of a largesystematic
decline in R&D intensity post-acquisition is difficult to find in a
statistical sense, but seems to be visible in the data. A glance at the
estimated differences in R&D intensity by year and time since acquisition
in Figure 4 does suggest the following: 1) there may be a negative effecc
during the nineteen-eighties (a succession of negative coefficients), even
though the earlier period is mixed, and 2) what effect there is appears to
be cumulative since it is still growing slightly in the secondyear after
the merger. Figure 5 helps to reconcile this result withmy earlier
Wilcoxon test for differences in the growth of R&D intensity between
acquiring and non-acquiring firms, since it shows that it makes a big
difference how finely one controls for pre-acquisit-ion R&D intensity, that
is whether one uses firm or industry levels. It would clearly be desirable
to augment the results for mergers in 1986 and 1987 through 1988 and 1989
in order to clarify the rather murky results in those years.
These hints of decline in R&D intensity post-acquisition during the
eighties lead me to ask the following question: Unlike the small NSF and
Fusfeld studies, neither this investigation nor my previous one42 explored
the differences between acquisitions undertaken with various kinds of
financing. The arguments given earlier imply that the source of the
problem (if there is one) is the associated change in the leverage ratio of
the acquiring firm. To investigate this question, I computed the total
42
Bronwyn H. Hall (1988).
27change in debt for the acquiring firm (including the debt taken on from the
acquiree) between the beginning and end of the year in which the
acquisition took place.I then divided this change in debt by the total
equity value of the seller at the time of acquisition, i.e., the price paid
by the buyer. This quantity is a kind of leverage ratio for the
acquisition itself if the acquisition was the main investment undertaken
by the firm during the year. It will be approximately zero if no new debt
was incurred to finance the transaction, and approximately one if the
transaction was completely financed by debt.
The dispersion of these leverage ratios was very wide,43 suggesting
that some acquisitions account for a relatively small portion of the
changes in debt levels experienced by the acquiring firms from one year to
the next. One implication of this fact is that this calculated leverage
ratio is a relatively blunt instrument with which to identify leveraged
acquisitions. Investigation of the buyer and seller in a sample of these
transactions during the relevant year in the Wall Street Journal Index
found that only 12 percent could clearly be identified as acquisitions
financed by debt; in an equal number of cases, the acquiring firm was in
financial trouble for other reasons and had increased its leverage by
taking out new financing. Many of them were too small to be mentioned, or
there was no evidence that the acquirer made any special financial
arrangements for the acquisition. If the acquisitions are relatively
unimportant to the overall acquiring firms, we have to ask ourselves
43The mean was 0.65 witha standard deviation of about 3, while the median
was -0.2, owing to a large number of observations with a slight decline in
debt in the transaction year. Over one third of the observations had debt
changes which were greater than the value of the acquisition in absolute
value (46 negative and 92 positive).
28whether the focus on acquisition-induced leverage is misdirected.It may
be that the real question we are interested in is the overall effect of
leverage, whether acquisition-induced or not; this is explored in the next
44
section.
I then compared these leveraged acquisitions to the leveraged buyouts
discussed earlier. Does the type of firm acquired determine the financial
structure of the acquisition, regardless of whether the acquirer is private
or public, or do the LROs have particular characteristics which can be
attributed to the fact that they are also management buyouts -- thatis,
the new owners are former managers who may have particular information
about the firm and how it should be managed. The acquisitions by public
firms on the other hand, are more likely to be driven by synergistic
considerations than by the benefits of debt restructuring; the choice of
debt as a means of finance may be a secondary consideration detetmined by
the type of firm being acquired. A table similar to Table 3 (not shown)
confirmed that the two types of leveraged transactions are quite different:
the 84 leveraged acquisitions are considerably smaller than the LBOs in
Table 3, they involve higher R&D relative to their size (about twice as
much per employee), and they are scattered across all industries, with a
slight majority in cyclical capital equipment industries. From this
evidence, it appears that the forces driving LBOs are not the same as those
which cause these types of acquisitions. The most likely reason for the
lack of similarity is that leverage in this case is only occasionally
44The acquisitions themselves were distributed across a wide sizerange.
Although half of them were less than 14 percent of the combined firm, about
one quarter were larger than 30 percent. The average size was 20 percent,
so they were not negligible with respect to the acquirer.
29related to the acquisition itself. In the next section I try a different
approach to estimating the effect of acquisition-induced leverage.
IV. Leverage
Earlier I suggested two commonly stated hypotheses which would imply a
negative relationship between corporate restructuring and R&D investment,
only one of which seemed to call for a policy response. There is an
intermediate position, in which financial markets are "efficient" in the
sense of pricing firms correctly conditional on the information available
to them, but where problems of asymmetric information between the managers
of a firm and its shareholders or potential shareholders lead to less than
optimal outcomes for the investment policy of the firm. A decline in R&D
associated with an increase in leverage may result in this world also, and
it may indeed be the case that our current financial structure (including
the tax system) discriminates against these types of intangible
investments.
Why might leverage be particularly negative for R&D investment? Many
authors have suggested reasons why the cost of external capital (debt or
equity) may be higher for R&D projects than for physical investments.
Leland and Pyle, and Kihlstrom and Matthews have argued that there is a
moral hazard problem in transferring information about a risky project from
an entrepreneur (firm) to investors (shareholders or debt holders), which
leads to a preference for retained earnings as a source of finance for this
type of investment.45 Bhattacharya and Ritter have shown that if there is a
45Hayne E. Leland and David H. Pyle, "InformationalAsymmetries, Financial
Structure, and Financial Intermediation," Journal Finance 32 (1977): pp.
371-387; Richard Kihlstrom and Steve Matthews, "Managerial Incentives in
30cost to revealing information about innovative projects to the market (and
hence, to potential competitors), firms will also find the cost of
external capital higher than that of internal finance.46 In the case of debt
finance, there is an additional problem, since banks (and other
bondholders) often prefer some sort of tangible security which can be sold
in the event of default. In cases where retained earnings are not
available, such as new startups, substantial equity shares (in the form of
venture capital), not long-term bonds, are the rule.
These arguments, together with the empirical evidence on liquidity and
investment, both old and new,47 restore the link between investment and the
source of finance which was broken by Modigliani and Miller. They also
imply that the cost of external finance, especially debt, will be higher
when investment projects are more uncertain, produce fewer redeployable
assets, have knowledge externalities, and are subject to more severe
asymmetric information problems between owners and managers. All of these
factors imply that internal finance will be more preferred for innovation
and R&D investment than for ordinary investment; an implication of this
fact is that an exogenous increase in the fraction of earnings devoted to
interest expense, such as that caused by an increase in long terirt debt,
will penalize these types of investments.
The difficulty of investigating this hypothesis in the data available
Publicly Traded Firms" (University of Pennsylvania, 1984).
46Sudipto Bhattacharya and Jay R. Ritter, "Innovation and Communication:
Signaling with Partial Disclosure," Review of Economic Studies L (1985):
pp. 331-346.
47For example, John R. Meyer and Edwin Kuh, IInvestmentDecision: n
EmpiricalStudy (Harvard University Press, 1957); Steven M. Fazzari, R.
Glenn Hubbard, and Bruce C. Petersen, "Financing Constraints and Corporate
Investment," Brookings Papers Economic Activity 1(1988): pp. 141-206.
31to us is that investors are not unaware of this link between investment and
financial policy and a finding that leverage decreases R&D investment may
only mean that that particular firm at that particular time is facing a set
of investment opportunities which do not have high payback potential and
reducing R&D while increasing debt may indeed be the optimal policy, at
least privately. In spite of this problem, I still believe it is
worthwhile to investigate firms where substantial increases in leverage
occur; full consideration of this simultaneity problem awaits further
48
work.
My approach to gathering the facts on leveraged restructurings is
similar to the one I followed for acquisitions in Section IV: I define a
leveraged restructuring as a firm-year where the increase in long term debt
is greater than 75 percent of the total market value of the firm (debt plus
equity) in the beginning of the year. There are 177 such restructurings;
their (size-weighted) distribution by year was shown in the last column of
Table 1. Unlike the other types of restructurings, these refinancings show
two period of increased activity, the early 1980s and after 1985.
In Table 5 I display the industry and R&D characteristics of the firms
involved in such restructurings. Unlike the LBOs shown earlier, these
transactions take place in all types of industries, although there does
seem to be a preference for those which are relatively capital intensive
(chemicals, petroleum, stone, clay, and glass, machinery, motor vehicles,
and aircraft), confirming the importance of redeployable assets in debt
is not simply a problem of simultaneity of the leverage and investment
decision; the problem is also that individual firm rationality in this
setting may not be socially optimal, since we are dealing with a type of
investment which has been shown repeatedly to have substantial
externalities.
32financing. The firms in question are less R&D-intensive than the others in
their industry (compare the fraction of industry employment with the
fraction of industry R&D) with two exceptions: the chemical industry, where
DuPont took on large amounts of debt to finance the Conoco acquisition in
l98l, and the automotive industry, where almost all of the total is the
restructuring of Chrysler Corporation in 1980-1982. Thus even here, we see
that the unsuitability of high leverage for R&D-intensive firms may be
having an effect.
I then go on to perform the same kind of investigation into
post-transaction R&D intensity as I did in the case of manufacturing sector
acquisitions. Specifically, I compute the average R&D intensity of
leveraging firms 0 to 3 years after the transaction, relative to the firms
in their industry. These differences in mean, which are again very
imprecisely determined, are shown in Figure 6. It is not surprising that
they are negative, since we already saw that these firms were relatively
less R&D intensive, but the absolute magnitude, particularly after 1983, is
rather startling: a difference of 2.5 percent in R&D intensity is a fifty
percent difference in R&D if the average level is 5 percent of sales (which
is typical of R&D-doing firms).
The figure also shows that the difference in R&D intensity is
essentially permanent: the curves for 1, 2, and 3 years out lie almost on
top of each other, and are larger than that for the year of leveraging. I
therefore treat the effect as permanent in the same way I did the
acquisition effect, in order to reduce the sampling variability, and
49This debt was later paid down fairly quickly and R&D in the combined
company increased both in level and as a percent of sales from 1981 to 1985
(Fusfeld, 1987).
33compute it relative to the firm's own lagged R&Dintensityin order to see
if there really was a decline. This is shown in Figure 7, which reveals
that the largest differences shown in Figure 6 are due to the differences
between leveraging and non-leveraging firms in pre-transaction R&D
intensity. When I control for the firm's own behavior, however, I still
show a decline in R&D spending which is roughly constant throughout the
period, and is on the order of magnitude of one half of one percent of
sales.5° The individual year effects are still jointly insignificant, but
the overall decline has a t-statistic of 3.0 (remember that neither of
these tests is completely valid, owing to the lack of independence across
observations).
Throughout this analysis I have treated leveraging analogously to
acquisitions, as though it were a discrete event, in order to compare the
results directly. However, the change in the leverage for these firms is
actually distributed as a continuous variable, for which I have arbitrarily
chosen a cutoff of .75 to define a restructuring.51 Ideally I would like to
use the full information in the leverage variable, but it is difficult to
know how to incorporate it in the absence of a fully specified model for
the Investment-financing choice. My solution is shown in Table 6: I
regress the R&D intensity of all the firms on the first three lags of the
leverage changes; the coefficients in this regression are the percent
50Both Figure 6 and Figure 7 use only data for R&D-performing firms, about
11,000 firm-year observations; the results are verysimilarif I use all
19,000 observations, treating firms which do not report R&D for one or more
years as having zero R&D during those years.
51To check the results, I also used .5 as a cutoff. As expected, the
negative coefficients were slightly smaller and more precisely measured due
to the larger sample. This suggest that using a continuous variable as I
do in the following may be a better idea.
34change in R&D intensity per an absolute change in leverage ratio. I have
again included year, industry, and the lagged R&D intensity for the firm as
controls.
The results are quite interesting: whether we look at all firms or
only R&D-doers, R&D intensity falls following an increase in leverage. The
full effect is about 0.75 and it takes at least three years to work
(using the numbers in the second and fourth columns). At the cutoff change
in leverage which I was using earlier, this is an absolute change of 0.56
percent in the R&D-to-sales ratio, which is consistent with Figure 7.For
a typical R&D-doing firm with an R&D-to-sales ratio of 3.7, this would
imply a decline in R&D spending of about 15 percent, which is not
negligible. Of course, most firms in most years do not experience this
kind of leverage increase, so that the aggregate declines will not be huge.
In this regression, I also investigated the role of acquisitions by
including a dummy for firms which had acquired one of the firms in my
sample during the past three years, and also interacting that dummy with
the change in leverage, to see if there was a separate additive effect from
acquisitions (the results on leverage were not significantly affected by
including these variables, so I only show the combined regression). The
basic conclusion from the regression is that the acquisition effect we saw
in Figure 5 is largely accounted for by controlling for changes in
leverage. The F-statistic for including these variables is very
insignificant, partly because the coefficients are so poorly measured.
Leverage does not appear to have any greater effect when it is associated
with making an acquisition, a fact which is not too surprising once we know
it.
The conclusion from this part of the investigation is that declines in
35R&D intensity do seem to follow after restructurings which increase
leverage, and that the small declines after acquisitions which I found
earlier may be associated with increased leverage rather than the
acquisition per se. Although this fact is interesting, and is consistent
with anecdotal evidence, the data have not yet told us whether the foregone
projects are ones that should have been funded.
V. Conclusions and Discussion
I begin my discussion of what we can conclude about the effects of
corporate restructuring on R&D by summarizing my empirical results. First,
I find that leveraged buyouts and other private acquisitions of publicly
traded manufacturing firms are taking place overwhelmingly in sectors where
R&D investment and innovation have not been important, at least to the
industry as a whole. The industries and firms in question are
those with the steady cash flow necessary to service the debt (they are
largely smaller firms in the consumer nondurable industries: Food,
Textiles, the auto parts sector of the Motor Vehicle industry, the tire
sector of the Rubber and Plastics industry, and Miscellaneous
Manufacturing) or those which have been downsizing for some time under
pressure from foreign competition and reduced innovative opportunities
(Textiles again, Fabricated Metals, and Stone, Clay, and Glass).
The total amount of R&D involved in ten years worth of transactions is
767 million dollars, a small fraction of the 40 billion-dollar industrial
R&D budget in 1982. Even if this R&D were to be cut drastically, it would
have little impact on total spending. In fact, although this R&D
disappeared from my aggregate statistics since the firms went private (and
ceased to report to the SEC), I cited evidence from Kaplan and Lichtenberg
36and Siegel that these firms did not reduce their spending as a result of
the transaction in any case.
The second finding was less clear: there was mixed evidence as to
whether acquiring firms in the publicly traded manufacturing sector
reduced their R&D intensity as a result of the acquisition. Firms involved
in acquisitions seemed to experience permanent declines in their
R&D intensity relative to other firms in their industry, but this effect
was stronger in the later part of the period than in the earlier, and was
partly due to the fact that the mix of firms making acquisitions shifted
toward firms with lower R&D intensities during the eighties. Although the
statistical evidence was weak, the size of the effect was large in economic
terms, amounting to a one-half of 1 percent decline in R&D intensity
for those firms engaged in R&D (that is, from an overall mean of 3.4
percent to 2.9 percent) for the 1982 to 1987 period. This decline did seem
to be associated with the more leveraged of the acquisitions, lending
credence to arguments that cash flow impacts R&D spending.
Finally, the most dramatic results of restructuring were found in
those transactions where a firm moves to a substantially higher debt
position than it had been in before; here the size of the decline in R&D
intensity was about 0.8 percent (from 3.4 to 2.6) for the 1982 to 1987
period. It appeared that the declines after acquisition could also be
attributed to increases in leverage, although the results on this question
are very imprecise, in spite of the large samples involved. This
statistical imprecision serves to remind us that the overwhelming
characteristic of a sample of firms is the variability of their experiences
and the number of factors actually involved in predicting outcomes; of
necessity, I have focused only on a limited part of the story.
37Does this result, that increased leverage is associated with declines
in R&D spending at the firmlevel,explain the decline in industrial R&D
spending in the late eighties? The answer to this question is "probably
not," for several reasons. First, for these firms there were two periods of
substantial leverage increase during the period in question, 1977 to 1980,
when the average change in leverage over all firms was about 0.04 and
1986-1987, when the change was about 0.037. During the earlier period, R&D
spending overall was growing substantially. Even in the later period, the
decline in overall R&D spending implied by this kind of leverage increase
is about one-half of 1 percent, which will not account for the observed
decline in growth rates.
However, these results are suggestive. Regardless of whether you
believe that leverage is efficiency-enhancing or that it leads to a decline
in productive investment, the link between leverage and reduced R&D
spending has been established. I would interpret the fact that the more
extreme forms of leverage increase (LBOs and other such transactions) are
occurring in industries not normally considered innovative and the fact that
they seem to have other efficiency benefits as evidence that the agency
cost hypothesis is the correct one, and that these transactions are
beneficial on the whole. On the other hand, I would argue that R&D
spending in general may be an unintended victim of the drive to shift the
source of financing toward debt, because its particular characteristics
make it unsuited to that type of corporate environment. The evidence
presented here supports this hypothesis, but far more work needs to be done
before we can clearly identify the problem and say what the solution is.
38Table 1
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publicly traded, but the acquisition could not be identified as a leveraged
buyout in any of my sources.




Total 780 77 173 9.72.6
The columns labelled "Private" are acquisitions where the acquirer was not
40Table 3
LEVERAGED BUYOUTS BY INDUSTRY: 1977-1987
Industry
R&D to No. Total R&D in
* salesofEmployment industrial LBOs % R&D
Industry ratio LBOs (l000s) R&D in '82 (1982 $)inLEOs
Food &
kindred prods. .160% 11 142.4 917.0 30.7 3.3%
Textiles
& apparel .169 16 203.2 73.0 60.2 82.
Chemicals,
exci. drugs 1.80 1 6.3 4033.6 2.4 0.06
Pharmaceuticals
& med. instr. 4.87 4 31.5 3556.4 113.5 3.2
Petroleum
refin. & extrc. .337 0 -- 3548.2 -- 0.0
Rubber &
misc, plastics .915 6 53.4 733.4 63.5 8.7
Stone
clay, & glass .372 3 62.2 263.0 21.7 8.3
Primary metals .269 2 10.0 370.4 4.2 1.1
Fabricated
metal products .563 8 32.0 331.6 12.8 3.9
Engines, farm &
const. equip. 1.37 4 21.5 1125.2 31.4 2.8
Computers,off.
& acct. equip. 5.32 0 -- 7858.5 -- 0.0
Other mach.,
not electric 1.58 7 15.1 617.3 10.7 1.7
Electric equip.
& supplies 4.40 1 1.4 2891.5 1.1 0.04
Electronic
equipment 3.44 1 29.7 5902.3 35.5 0.6
Motor vehicles
& trans. equip. .766 4 95.5 2969.5 69.6 2.3
Aircraft &
aerospace 2.02 0 -- 3249.6 -- 0.0
Prof. &
sci. equipment4.10 1 3.5 746.5 9.5 1.3
Lumber,
wood, & paper .342 3 7.1 701.8 0.6 0.09
Miscellaneous
manufacturers .340 5 16.8 448.1 3.2 0.7
Total 1.82 78 761.5 40,341.9 470.6 1.2
*
Theindustry definitions are given in Appendix A.
**
TheR&D to sales ratio for the industry in 1982 is shown.
41Table 4
POST-ACQUISITION R&D INTENSITY
Dependent Variable: R&D/Sales (percent)
20,204 observations (includes non-R&D doers)
Dummyifacquisition occurred *





























*Thisis the F-statistic for a test that the four acqutsitlon effects
are zero.
42Table 5
FINANCIAL RESTRUCTURINGS WITH SUBSTANTIAL DEBT-EQUITY CHANGES
*
1977-1987
* Employment% industry R&D % industry
Industry Number (l000s) employment (1982 $) R&D
Food&
kindred prods. 14 32.0 1.6 1.7 0.2
Textiles
& apparel 11 63.0 10.8 3,3
Chemicals,
exci. drugs 5 138.5 10.5 546.3 13.5
Pharmaceuticals
& med. instr. 5 46.2 5.7 109.6 3.1
Petroleum
refin. & extrc. 5 224.9 13.1 400.9 11.3
Rubber &
misc. plastics 7 8.1 2.0 0.3 0.04
Stone,
clay, & glass 5 30,6 11.6 30.5 11.6
Primary metals 11 30.3 4.0 1.8 0.5
Fabricated
metal products 9 15.3 3.2 5.4 1.6
Engines, farm &
const. equip. 7 13.0 3.0 20.5 1.8
Computers, off.
& acct. equip. 7 65.0 5.4 278.1 3.5
Other mach.,
not electric 18 90.9 18.4 113.7 18.4
Electric equip.
& supplies 8 29.3 1.9 13.5 0.5
Electronic
equipment 6 2.8 0.2 3.5 0.06
Motor vehicles
& trans. equip. 9 168.5 10.4 460.9 15.5
Aircraft &
aerospace 5 88.2 7.6 102.7 3.2
Prof. &
sci. equipment 2 2.2 0.4 0.0 0.0
Lumber,
wood, & paper 14 21.5 2.8 10.1 1.4
Miscellaneous
manufacturers 29 69.3 2.8 1.6 0.4
Total 177 1144.9 5.8 2099.8 5.2
The industry definitions are given in Appendix A.
A restructuring is defined to be a firm whose long-term debt increases
in one year by more than 75% of the total market value of the firm.
43Table 6
R&D INTENSITY ANDCHANGESIN LEVERAGE
1977-1987
mci.non-R&D Doers R&D-Doing Firms Only
Variables (16,498 obs.) (9982 obs.)




L\LeV -.29(.15) -.24(.iO) -.23(.27) -.27(.18)
-2
Lev -.31(.14) -.l5(.1O) -.33(.26)
-.19(.l8)
Acquiring Firms Post-Acquisition (Relative)
Intercept -.08(.l4) -.03(.09) -.39(.21) -.18(.14)
tLev -.06(.49) -.18(.33) -.36(.86)
-.13(.60)
ALev -.13(.47) O.02(.32) -.74(.84) -.26(.58)
Lev -.16(.48) O.11(.32) -.43(.90) O.21(.62)
Othervars Year dummies, Year dummies, Year dummies, Year dummies,
in regression md. dummies R/S2 md. dummies R/S2
Standard error 3.29 2.22 3.95 2.74
**
F-statistic 0.06 0.09 0.26 0.10
(DF) (4,16462) (4,16479) (4,9946) (4,9963)
The dependent variable is the R&D-to-sales ratio of the firm in each
year.
*
Lev is the change in long term debt during the year divided by the
total market value of the firm (debt plus equity).
**
This is the F-statistic for a test that the hypothesized acquisition
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Appendix A
COMPOSITION OF INDUSTRY CLASSES
Included SIC groups
Food and Kindred Products
Textiles and Apparel
Chemicals, excluding Drugs
Pharmaceuticals & Medical Equipment
Petroleum Refining and Extraction
Rubber and Miscellaneous Plastics
Stone, Clay, and Glass
Primary Metals
Fabricated Metal Products
Engines, Farm & Construction Equipment
Office, Computer, & Accounting Equipment
Other Machinery, not Electric
Electric Equipment and Supplies
Electronic Equipment




















37, excluding 3720-3729, 3760
3720-3729, 3760
38, excluding 3841, 3843
24, 25, 26
21,31, 3900-3989, 3480
27, 3990
3510-3536, 357
36 50-3679
Aerospace
and Scientific Equipment
and Paper
ConsumerGoods
Manufacturers,N.E.C.
49